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THE LAW ON COMPENSATION RIGHTS FOR 
REDUCTION IN PROPERTY VALUES DUE TO 
PLANNING DECISIONS IN THE  
UNITED KINGDOM 
MICHAEL PURDUE∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the current law of Town and Country Planning in the United 
Kingdom, owners of land have no direct legal right to compensation for 
any financial loss caused by the particular designation of land in a 
development plan. In addition, landowners do not have a right to 
compensation for the refusal of planning permission or for the placement 
of conditions on land-use planning.  
As we will see, rights to compensation in the U.K. are very limited and 
are largely related to the revocation or modification of a valid planning 
permission.1 In some situations, landowners may also be able to require 
authorities to purchase their lands. This is limited to cases where either (1) 
the land is zoned for public works that requires the land to be publicly 
owned, or (2) a development control decision renders the property 
incapable of any beneficial use. The overriding principle, however, is that 
where the development of land is restricted in the name of the public 
interest, landowners do not have the right to compensation. 
A. History 
Early statutes, such as the Town and Country Planning Act 1909 and 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1932, imposed a duty on local 
authorities to pay compensation to owners who suffered losses as a result 
of the authorities’ planning schemes. However, just as local authorities 
 
 
 ∗ Professor at the Department of Law of City University London England; Solicitor of the 
Supreme Court; LL.B and LL.M from London University; Editor of the Journal of Planning and 
Environment Law. 
 1. “Planning permission” in the U.K. means that planning law is granted on a case-by-case basis 
in a discretionary manner. One may view this as similar to a combination of a Planned Unit 
Development, a site plan, and a building permit. Development plans do not grant development rights. 
Although the local authorities are obliged to prepare development plans, they are not binding like an 
American zoning bylaw or a Continental European detailed plan. In the U.K., the planning authorities 
may digress from these plans if they have good reason. Furthermore, U.K.-style locals plan are usually 
not as detailed as American zoning or Continental European detailed plans. 
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had a duty to pay compensation for losses, they were also empowered to 
recoup the betterment (the increase in value) created by these planning 
schemes.  
Later, the Town and Country Planning Act 19472 adopted the “shifting 
value theory”3 and nationalized the prospective development value of 
land. A compensation fund was established at the fairly arbitrary sum of 
£300 million.4 Claims could be submitted for the development rights that 
were abolished by the 1947 Act. Afterwards, no development rights would 
be granted by development plans, and no compensation could be claimed 
for the refusal of planning permission (except in special circumstances).  
This right to the “unexpended balance of established value” remained 
as an historic vestige until it was abolished on September 25, 1991 by the 
Planning and Compensation Act 1991.5 By that time, the amounts had 
become very small because of inflation, and the whole process had 
become largely obsolete. However, the distinction between “new” and 
“existing” development can still be found in some existing legislation, but 
its importance is marginal.6 
 
 
 2. Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, c. 53 (Eng.). 
 3. This theory was proposed in AUGUSTUS ANDREWES UTHWATT, EXPERT COMMITTEE ON 
COMPENSATION AND BETTERMENT: FINAL REPORT (His Majesty’s Stationery Office 1942). According 
to this theory, in each region, the demand for land uses of each type is more or less finite; therefore, 
granting development rights in advance, as done by traditional land-use plans (or zoning), enriches 
some landowners while depriving others. This was the rationale for abolishing development rights in 
preference for a system where decisions on whether to approve a particular proposed development 
would be decided on a case-by-case basis, according to the real demand when the development 
initiative is ripe. The role of plans is to provide the longer-range strategy.  
 4. In return, a betterment levy was imposed when this development value was accrued by the 
granting of planning permission. However, following a change of government in 1954, the betterment 
levy was abolished. 
 5. See generally Planning and Compensation Act, 1991, c. 34 (U.K.). 
 6. The heading of Schedule 3 to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is “Development Not 
Constituting New Development.” Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, sched. 3 (Eng.). 
Schedule 3 then distinguishes between “development not ranking for compensation” and 
“development ranking for compensation.”  
 “Development not ranking for compensation” is set out in Part 1 of Schedule 3 and covers certain 
rebuilding and alteration operations as well as the change of use to two separate dwelling houses. 
“Development ranking for compensation” is set out in Part 2 of Schedule 3 and covers various 
operations and uses.  
 The rationale seems to be that all these operations and uses of land, although technically requiring 
planning permission as development, were closely related to the existing buildings (or past buildings, 
in the case of Part 1) or the current ways in which the land was being put to use. Presumably because 
of the high costs that would be involved, the 1990 Act only provided for a right to compensation in the 
case of Part 2 when permission was refused. This right to compensation, which was set out in section 
114 of the 1990 Act, was abolished in September 1991, and Part 2 of the schedule is gone. Yet, as we 
will see, Part 1 of Schedule 3 and this old distinction between “new” and “existing” development may 
still have roles to play in deciding whether a purchase notice can be served. In addition, this distinction 
may affect the amount of compensation payable if property is compulsorily acquired. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/4
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B. The European Convention on Human Rights 
The basic absence of compensation rights for denial of permission to 
develop does not contradict the European Convention on Human Rights.7 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and United 
Kingdom courts strongly indicate that the United Kingdom law is not 
incompatible.  
Development control decisions can raise issues concerning article 8 of 
the European Convention (the right to respect for private life, family life, 
and a home),8 both in respect of the applicant and those opposed to the 
development. However, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, any 
interference is justifiable as pursuant of a legitimate aim.  
Similarly, planning decisions could bring into play article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the Convention, which protects property rights from 
interference.9 However, again an outright deprivation of property is 
normally justifiable as long as reasonable compensation is paid, and 
control over property without the payment of compensation is justifiable 
unless the restriction is so severe that it amounts to a taking of land. The 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 199810 brought into force in United 
Kingdom law most of the rights set out in the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Human Rights Act does not seem to have substantially 
altered the assessment that U.K. law is in compliance with the European 
Convention. 
C. Situations Where Compensation Rights Do Exist 
We will now look at U.K. law in more detail and analyze the 
situations–infrequent in practice–where some rights to compensation do 
exist in the current law. 
I. INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING PLANNING RIGHTS 
As we have seen, the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 
distinguished between “new” development and the “existing” use of land. 
 
 
 7. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter 
ECHR]. 
 8. Id. art. 8. Article 8 § 1 provides: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, [and] his home . . . .” 
 9. Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Prot. 1 ECHR]. 
 10. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
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Following this distinction, the Act provides for compensation where there 
is an interference with development, which was either lawfully developed 
or has become lawful because of a failure to take enforcement action. 
Even where development has not yet been carried out, compensation rights 
can arise where planning permissions are revoked or modified. 
A. Orders Requiring the Discontinuance of a Use, Limitations to That 
Use, or the Removal or Alteration of Buildings 
Under section 102 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (the 
“1990 Act”), local planning authorities (LPAs) have broad powers. Where 
local authorities “consider it expedient in the interests of proper planning 
of their area (including the interests of amenity),”11 they are empowered 
“to require the discontinuance of any use of land, or to impose conditions 
on its continued use, or to require . . . steps . . . for the alteration or 
removal of buildings or works.”12 
The compensation rights are set out in section 115 and cover damages 
suffered by any person because of the depreciation of the value of an 
interest in land or mineral which that person owns.13 Compensation rights 
also extend to damages caused by the disturbance of the enjoyment of land 
and for the reasonable expenses involved in complying with the order.14  
Compensation is calculated according to the ordinary rules for the 
compulsory purchase of land as laid down in section 5 of the Land 
Compensation Act 1961,15 subject to obvious modifications because no 
interest in land is actually being purchased. Thus, compensation should 
not include any value derived from a use that is unlawful. The Lands 
Tribunal has held that the date for assessing the value of the damage is the 
date of the confirmation of the order.16 This means that compensation 
includes the damage incurred by a landowner who bought new equipment 
 
 
 11. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 102 (Eng.). 
 12. Id. It is not clear why section 102 specifically refers to interests of amenity, as the need to 
promote and protect amenity would be one of the standard purposes of planning. However, it is worth 
noting that in Re Lamplugh, (1967) 19 P. & C.R. 125 (Q.B.), the court held that an order could be 
made to protect potential damage to amenities. The facts of the case reveal the draconian nature of the 
power as it was used to require the demolition of an old watchhouse on a cliff, which it was accepted, 
did not at present damage amenities but which might if it later were to be unused and fall into 
disrepair. However, all such orders require the confirmation of the Secretary of State, and persons who 
object to a proposed order have a right to a hearing. Town and Country Planning Act, 1991 c. 8, § 103. 
 13. Id. § 115. There are special provisions relating to minerals discontinuance orders. Id. § 116. 
 14. Id. § 115. 
 15. Land Compensation Act, 1961, c. 33, § 5 (U.K.). 
 16. K. & B. Metals Ltd. v. Birmingham City Council, (1977) 33 P. & C.R. 135 (Eng.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/4
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(which would have to be sold at a loss) after the service of the 
discontinuance order but before its confirmation. 
B. Revocation and Modification of Planning Permissions That Have Not 
Yet Been Implemented 
The right to compensation applies in cases where an “express” 
planning permission17 is revoked. Interestingly, this right also applies to 
revocation of a planning permission “deemed to have been granted,” 
where a development request falls within one of the classes of permitted 
development set out in development orders.18 A right to compensation 
applies even when the right to carry out the permitted development is lost, 
not by revocation of a particular permit, but by the central government’s 
amendment of the development order itself.  
This contrasts with the position of the Use Classes Order 1987,19 which 
has the effect of taking the change out of the definition of development 
rather than granting (automatic) permission for changes of use. In the case 
of the Use Classes Order, as long as the order is amended before the 
development has commenced, there is no right to compensation. This 
holds even though the result is that prior to the amendment, permission 
would not have been needed for the change. Compensation is not payable 
even though the landowner may have incurred costs in anticipation of 
making use of the order’s protection, which was then taken away. 
Presumably the logic behind the Use Classes Order is that no permitted 
development rights are granted. However, the distinction seems 
anomalous because the effect on the people who will now have to seek 
planning permission (provided the change is material and so within the 
definition of development) is the same as with the amendment of a 
development order. 
Under section 97, a local planning authority may revoke or modify 
express grants of planning permission if the LPA considers it to be 
expedient with regard to the development plan and any other material 
considerations.20 Confirmation of the Secretary of State is required.21 
 
 
 17. An express planning permission is one that is actually granted by the Local Planning 
Authority. An express permission is necessary in most cases of development, unless it falls under an 
automatically “permitted development.” 
 18. A development order sets out a list of types of development (mostly minor additions or minor 
use changes) in which a permit is “automatically” deemed to have been granted. 
 19. See The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order, 1987, S.I. 1987/764. 
 20. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 97 (Eng.). 
 21. There are similar confirmation procedures for discontinuance notices. 
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Revocation can only apply where the development permitted has not yet 
been carried out. A case of a “material change of use” involves the 
difficult task of determining just when the development took place; in the 
case of an operation, revocation or modification has no effect regarding an 
operation that has already been carried out. In this regard, a case that was 
concerned with the Scottish equivalent of the provision held that the 
crucial date is the date that the local planning authority made the order, not 
the date of confirmation.22 To hold otherwise would make it very easy for 
a landowner or occupier to defeat the revocation by commencing 
development as soon as an order is received. Of course, even when it is 
too late to serve a revocation order, the same objectives can be achieved 
by using the discontinuous notice powers. 
Under section 107, compensation is payable for both expenditures in 
carrying out abortive works and losses directly attributable to the 
revocation or modification. This can include loss of anticipated profits 
where the damage resulting from the loss of a contract is not too remote.23 
The wording makes clear that there has to be a direct link between the 
damage and the revocation or modification. Therefore, losses or damages 
resulting from actions taken before the grant of permission are excluded 
from compensation.  
In calculating the depreciation on the value of the land, it must be 
assumed that permission would be granted for rebuilding and building 
alterations.24 This would normally result in a reduction in the amount of 
compensation because, in calculating the value of the land following the 
revocation, one would have to assume that planning permission would still 
be granted for such development, thus increasing the notional value of the 
land. However, this is illogical because permission may well be refused 
for such development; today, there is no right to compensation following a 
refusal to grant planning permission. These potentially harsh and absurd 
consequences are a hangover from the 1947 Act.  
These harsh consequences were forcefully illustrated in the House of 
Lords decision in Canterbury City Council v. Colley,25 which involved the 
revocation of a permission to demolish and rebuild an existing building 
(permitted before 1947).26 The effect of the statutory assumption was to 
eliminate all compensation for the depreciation of the land value 
 
 
 22. See Caledonian Terminal Inv. Ltd. v. Edinburgh Corp., 1970 S.L.T. 362 (1970) (Scot.). 
 23. See Hobbs (Quarries) Ltd. v. Somerset County Council, (1975) 30 P. & C.R. 286, 291 (Eng.). 
 24. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 107(4) (Eng.); Id. c. 8, sched. 3, pt. 1. 
 25. (1993) 1 All E.R. 591 (H.L.) (Eng.). 
 26. Id. 
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occasioned by the revocation.27 While it was accepted that the provision 
was anomalous, the provision was nevertheless held to be mandatory.28 It 
followed that there was no escape from the proposition that it must be 
applied even in the case of the notional permission to be assumed is the 
very permission that has in fact been revoked.29  
As is the case with discontinuance notices, the Secretary of State has a 
default power to issue a revocation order to a planning permission.30 The 
compensation claim has to be made by a person with an interest in the 
land. In Pennine Raceways Ltd. v. Kirklees M C (No 1),31 the Court of 
Appeal held that this wording included enforceable contractual rights, 
such as licences, as well as legal or equitable interests in land. 
In practice, cases of revocation of planning permission are very rare. 
The fact that the service of such notices results in compensation means 
that they are rarely used by local planning authorities and the government. 
In an answer to a Parliamentary question, the government made clear that 
the default power would only be used where the grant of planning 
permission was grossly wrong and damaging to the wider public interest. 
However, this power does extend to situations when similar planning 
applications have been treated inconsistently without justification.32  
In the case of orders served by the Secretary of State, the liability to 
pay compensation falls on the local planning authority that granted the 
permission.33 In a way, this is logical because the LPA presumably caused 
the problem by granting permission in the first place. However, the 
amount of compensation can be very high, thus potentially having a very 
adverse impact on the finances of the local authority.  
When deciding whether to issue a revocation order, one legal question is 
whether the local planning authority is authorized to take the financial burden 
into account. In Alnwick D.C. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport, and the Regions,34 the plaintiff argued that the Secretary of State 
should have taken into account the financial consequences of a modification 
when considering whether it was expedient to make the order. Mr. Justice 
Richards rejected this argument on the grounds that in order for the financial 
consequences to be material considerations, they would have to relate to the 
 
 
 27. See id. at 598. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 100 (Eng.). 
 31. [1983] Q.B. 382. 
 32. See Hansard in 164 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1989) 327–8w. 
 33. See Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, sched. 1, ¶ 18 (Eng.). 
 34. [2000] 79 P. & C.R. 130 (Q.B. 1999).  
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use and development of land.35 The council had tried to argue that the 
financial loss would have adverse consequences for their proposed leisure 
facilities, but Mr. Justice Richards found these to be too indirect to be 
material considerations. This decision makes logical sense because, as Mr. 
Justice Richards pointed out, it would be odd if the statutory provision for 
compensation for revocation would itself be a reason for not making an 
order. However in practice, both the local planning authorities and the 
Secretary of State will inevitably be influenced by the high costs of making 
such orders. 
C. Voiding a Permit Through Judicial Review (With No Compensation 
Rights) 
In situations where revocation is necessary, local planning authorities 
may have an alternate legal option that spares them from the need to 
compensate. Where a grant of planning permission is judged to have been 
grossly wrong, there are very likely strong grounds for holding the grant to 
be not only wrong, but invalid in law. An alternative to a revocation order 
that has the advantage of not requiring the payment of compensation is to 
get the grant quashed by resorting to an application for judicial review. 
This, however, requires the rather strange spectacle of the LPA or one of 
its members bringing an application to strike down its own previous 
decision. The courts have held so far that this remedy is a possibility, but it 
may depend on the particular facts.36  
When it is apparent that an LPA is applying for judicial review to 
invalidate a planning permission as a way of saving compensation money, 
the courts might refuse the application. In R. v. Restormel Borough 
Council ex parte Parkyn and Corbett,37 not only was the application for 
judicial review made after a long delay and after the Secretary of State had 
decided to make a modification order, but the applicant had done nothing 
to cause the grant to be invalid. The error of law had been made by the 
local planning authority. The Court of Appeal refused the application. The 
exact rationale of the decision is difficult to ascertain because the refusal 
to quash the decision was based on a wide range of factors. However, the 
basic reasoning of the majority seems to have been that justice required 
that the owners of the land should not be deprived of compensation. In this 
 
 
 35. Id. at 192. 
 36. See R. v. Bassetlaw D.C. exp Oxby, [1999] P.L.C.R. 283 (rejecting the argument that it was 
wrong for a local planning authority to seek judicial review of its grant of permission.). 
 37. [2001] J.P.L. 445 (Q.B.D. 2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/4
p493 Purdue book pages.doc05/06/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] COMPENSATION RIGHTS IN THE U.K. 501 
 
 
 
 
regard, Lord Justice Schiemann argued that where there is a choice 
between putting the burden of loss on the applicant or the council, it 
should fall on the council rather than the individual. Lord Justice Sedley 
disagreed with this approach, arguing that the injustice of depriving the 
applicant of compensation for the loss of the permission was no greater in 
principle than the injustice of awarding the applicant a windfall at the 
public’s expense. In this regard, it can certainly be argued that if the grant 
is grossly wrong, the applicant should not benefit from the mistakes of the 
local planning authority because the permission should never have been 
granted in the first place. 
Even when the Secretary of State has no intention of revoking or 
modifying a permission, theoretically a local planning authority could use 
judicial review as an alternative to seeking revocation and having to pay 
compensation, if there were grounds on which to challenge the validity of 
the permission. Basically, the same principles would apply; however, the 
courts would be even less likely to allow this remedy, except in cases 
where the applicant had induced the grounds of invalidity. 
D. Revocations or Modifications of the Classes of Permitted Development 
Rights to permitted development38 can be lost in three main ways. 
First, article 4 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted 
Development) Order 1995 provides that the Secretary of State and LPAs 
can make directions that restrict the operation of a class of permitted 
development within a specified area or to a specified development.39 Such 
directions normally require the confirmation of the Secretary of State 
when made by a local planning authority. Second, the Secretary of State 
may simply use the power to amend the Order and so abolish or restrict a 
class. Third, the descriptions of the classes of permitted development 
mean that the designation of the land or building can change the permitted 
rights. For example, if land is designated as a conservation area, it 
becomes article 1(5) land. And in the case of the right to install a 
telecommunication apparatus under Part 24 Class A, the right will be lost 
or restricted unless the right to carry out development has somehow 
 
 
 38. Permits that are “deemed to have been granted” apply to some types of small-scale 
development or minor changes. 
 39. The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order, 1995, S.I. 
1995/418, art. 4. The Order provides for various limitations and exceptions to this power. 
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crystallized.40 In this third situation, there is no provision for the payment 
of compensation. 
In the first two situations, under section 108, compensation is payable 
if subsequently there is a refusal or conditional grant of (express) planning 
permission for development that formerly would have been permitted 
under the 1995 Order, so long as the pre-condition that the application be 
made within twelve months of the date when the revocation or amendment 
took place is satisfied.  
The 1990 Act distinguishes between express grants of permission and 
the classes of permitted development. This is justified by the fact that the 
classes of permitted development are development rights that are available 
to all who come within the terms of the grant and are not specific to a 
particular piece of land. Thus, those seeking compensation must first test 
whether, despite the restrictions, express planning permission in regard to 
a specific development may be acceptable. Presumably, the time limit is 
imposed so that only those who were in the process of preparing for a 
development will, in practice, be compensated. However, there is nothing 
to prevent anyone who is made aware of the restrictions from deciding to 
set up the pre-conditions for a compensation claim.  
The right to compensation is provided by section 108(1), applying 
section 107 as if there had been a revocation or modification of an express 
grant of planning permission.41 There is a provision for the fact that 
compensation has become payable to be registered as a land charge,42 and 
section 111 provides for a claw back of compensation that has been 
made.43 This is done by making it unlawful to carry out the development 
for which compensation has been registered, but only in cases of complete 
revocation of the rights, not a modification.44 
II. PURCHASE NOTICES 
The closest that United Kingdom law gets to providing for 
compensation for an adverse development control decision is the 
 
 
 40. In the case of R (on behalf of Orange PCS Limited) v Islington London Borough Council 
Times, January 24 2006, [2006] J.P.L. 1309, it was held that the rights had crystallized when the 
developer had submitted plans for the installation under the prior approval process. 
 41. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 108(1) (Eng.). 
 42. Id. § 110. 
 43. Id. § 111. 
 44. Id. 
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mechanism of the purchase notice. However, successful purchase notices 
are extremely rare.45  
The underlying requirement is that “the land must have become 
incapable of reasonable beneficial use in its existing state.”46 The rationale 
is that when the control over development is so restrictive that the land 
cannot be put to a beneficial use, it is the equivalent of a taking of the land 
and so the LPA should be required to purchase what has become a 
worthless piece of land. This process is sometimes referred to as a reverse 
compulsory purchase. Of course, a condition that in substance requires 
landowners to dedicate their lands to the public or requires land to be 
occupied by certain persons may be challenged on the grounds of 
legality.47 However, this is a rather different situation because the 
developer may still benefit from the development. In any case, LPAs today 
would simply subject the commencement of the development to certain 
pre-conditions, such as dedication of land. 
The purchase notice process applies when the planning decision is 
lawful but very restrictive. It applies not only when planning permission 
has been refused or granted subject to conditions, but also when 
discontinuance or revocation orders have been made. In such cases, the 
person served with such an order has a choice of seeking compensation for 
the revocation (as explained above) or serving a purchase notice on the 
LPA. However, the provisions relating to purchase notices are very 
narrowly drawn; thus, successful notices are very rare. 
A. The Correct Unit of Land 
Under section 137, a pre-condition for a successful notice is that “the 
land” has been the subject of an adverse planning decision, normally a 
refusal of planning permission. It is the owner48 of the land that can serve 
the purchase notice. The courts have held that the person or persons 
serving the notice must own all of that land, and the purchase notice 
cannot relate to part of that land. Thus, in Smart & Courtney Dale Ltd. v. 
 
 
 45. VICTOR MOORE, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PLANNING LAW § 5.28 (9th ed. 2005). In 
2000–2001, only fourteen notices were referred to the Secretary of State, and all of these were 
unsuccessful because they were either rejected, found to be invalid, or withdrawn. 
 46. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 137 (Eng.). 
 47. See Hall & Co. Ltd. v. Shreham-by-Sea Urban Dist. Council, [1964] 15 P. & C.R. 192 
(Q.B.D. 1963); Regina v. Hillingdon London Borough Council Ex Parte Royco Homes Ltd., [1974] 
Q.B.D. 720.  
 48. Defined by section 336(1) as the person entitled to the rack rent and so would exclude a 
freeholder who had let the land for less than a rack rent. For a detailed consideration of the definition 
in relation to purchase notices, see Ministerial Decision, [1980] J. Plan. L. 53 (U.K.).  
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Dover R.D.C.,49 the Lands Tribunal held that a purchase notice is invalid if 
the claimants do not own all the land but several owners can join together 
and serve a notice. The purchase notice can however relate to only part of 
the land that is the subject of the planning decision where the decision, in 
effect, severs the land by granting permission for part of the land and 
refusing permission for the rest of the land.  
More importantly, the need to relate the purchase notice to all of the 
land means that it is not enough if just part of the land is not capable of 
reasonable beneficial use. This question must be determined by looking at 
the totality of the land. Thus, in Wain v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment,50 Lord Denning stated that where a part of the land is the 
subject of a purchase notice and is of beneficial use, and part of the land is 
not of beneficial use, the owner cannot require that the land be purchased 
from him. In such a situation, the landowner can apply for permission to 
develop the part of the land that had been held to be incapable of 
beneficial use. 
B. No Need to Show Causation 
Section 137 does not expressly state that it is necessary to prove that 
the land has become incapable of reasonable beneficial use because of the 
adverse planning decisions. It is not enough simply to produce evidence 
that under the current use, the land is incapable of reasonable beneficial 
use; claimants must also have either applied for planning permissions or 
been served revocation or discontinuance orders.  
But the courts have held that landowners do not need to show that the 
adverse planning decision directly caused the land to be so incapable. In 
Purbeck District Council v. Secretary of State of the Environment,51 which 
involved a purchase notice concerning an area of marshland, Mr. Justice 
Woolf held that it was not incumbent on the server of the notice to show 
that there was a causal connection between the adverse planning decision 
occasioning the notice and the fact that the land is incapable of reasonable 
beneficial use. It also does not even matter that the owner may have 
caused the land to be in its current state,52 unless this was the result of 
unlawful development and it is not too late to take enforcement action.53 
 
 
 49. Smart & Courtenay Dale Ltd. v. Dover R.D.C., (1972) 23 P. & C.P. 408.  
 50. Wain v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1982) 44 P. & C.R. 289 (Q.B.D.). 
 51. Cf. Purbeck Dist. Council v. Secretary of State of the Env’t, (1983) 46 C. & P. R. 1 (Q.B.D.). 
 52. See West Bromwich BC v. Minister of Hous. and Local Gov’t, [1968] R. & V.R. 349.  
 53. This was made clear by the Court of Appeal in Balco Transport Services Ltd. v. Secretary of 
State for the Environment No. 2, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 88 (A.C.). There, agricultural land had been made 
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C. The Meaning of “Incapable of Reasonable Beneficial Use” 
The key word here is “beneficial.” While the fact that money can be 
derived from the existing use is clearly evidence that the use is beneficial, 
the absence of income is not necessarily conclusive that the use is not 
beneficial. Thus, a series of ministerial decisions has held that “garden” 
use may be a reasonably beneficial use because a garden will usually 
increase the value of an owned house, even though the garden itself does 
not produce income. In the Court of Appeal decision Colley v. Secretary of 
State for the Environment,54 land was capable of being used for the 
production of wood through forestry. While there would be no significant 
income in the early years of forestry, the capital value of the land would 
increase. The Inspector therefore held that the land was capable of 
reasonable beneficial use as commercial woodland. Mr. Justice Evans 
stated: 
The Inspector concluded that the land was capable of reasonably 
beneficial use as commercial woodland, and I agree that this 
conclusion was open to him. Whatever he may have taken 
“reasonably beneficial” to mean, it cannot have been financial 
benefit, because on the evidence this was non-existent on any 
sensible accounting basis. But it is not wrong in principle to say, as 
Circular 13/83 does, that the concept is not synonymous with 
profit.55 
Although Circular 13/83 said that it is relevant whether there is a 
market for the land or not, Mr. Justice Evans left this point open. 
I prefer to leave open what the connection is, if there is one, 
between land becoming “incapable of reasonably beneficial use in 
 
 
incapable of reasonable beneficial use because hardcore (hard material such as builder’s rubble) had 
been laid down without obtaining planning permission. It was now too late to take enforcement action 
because of the “four-year” rule.  
 The context of the four-year rule is the following. Generally, an unauthorized development 
becomes lawful if, after a specified length of time, no enforcement action has been taken. In the case 
of operational development, the span of time is four years. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 
8, § 171 (Eng.).  
 Lord Justice Glidewell said that the conditions for confirming a purchase notice would not have 
been satisfied if an enforcement notice could still have been served and this would have restored the 
land to a beneficial state. On the other hand, it has been held that if improvements could be made to 
the land that would make it capable of reasonable beneficial use, this can be grounds for defeating a 
purchase notice if those works can be carried out lawfully without planning permission. Balco Transp. 
Services Ltd. v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t No. 2, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 88 (A.C.). 
 54. Colley v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, (1999) 77 P. & C.R. 190 (A.C.). 
 55. Id. at 200. 
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its existing state” within section 137(3)(a) of the 1990 Act and the 
existence or otherwise of a market for the land. “Market” is an 
elusive concept. It may mean no more than that a purchaser can be 
found, who may have a special reason for buying the land in 
question, or it may be intended to have the same meaning as 
“available market,” the phrase used in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, 
s.51(3). It seems to me that introducing the idea of “market” and 
“market value” creates a possible source of confusion. Section 
137(3)(a) is concerned with use, rather than the value of the land.56 
Thus, it seems that the use must be beneficial to the owner or 
prospective owner; it is not sufficient that the use, such as open land, 
might be beneficial to the public generally.57 
The qualifying word “reasonably” might indicate that some sort of 
comparison can be made to other kinds of uses to which the land can be 
put. However, it is clearly irrelevant that the land in its existing use is less 
beneficial than it would be if planning permission had not been refused for 
the proposed use.  
This question of comparison is made very obscure by section 138.58 
The section first provides that, in deciding whether land is incapable of 
beneficial use, no account shall be taken of any unauthorized prospective 
use of that land.59 This is logical because it is irrelevant that land is 
capable of beneficial use if such a use is unlawful. Of course, such 
development can be authorized by the grant of planning permission, and 
there is an express provision for the Secretary of State to direct that 
permission should be granted.60 The converse, of course, is that account 
can be taken of authorized development.61  
Section 138(2) goes on to state that a prospective use of land shall be 
regarded as unauthorized if it would involve the carrying out of 
development other than Part 1 of Schedule 3 development.62 This seems to 
suggest that one can take account of such development, which could mean 
 
 
 56. Id.  
 57. See Adams & Wade Ltd. v. Minister of Hous. and Local Gov’t, (1967) 18 P. & C.R. 190 
(Q.B.D.). 
 58. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 138(1) (Eng.). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 141(3) (Eng.). This power arises where the 
purchase notice is referred to the Secretary of State because a land planning authority refuses to accept 
the notice.  
 61. See, e.g., Gavaghan v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, (1988) 59 P. & C.R. 124 (Q.B.D.); 
Gauaghan v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, (1989) 60 P. & C.R. 515 (A.C.). 
 62. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 138(2) (Eng.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/4
p493 Purdue book pages.doc05/06/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] COMPENSATION RIGHTS IN THE U.K. 507 
 
 
 
 
that a purchase notice could not be served, if such development would 
make the land capable of beneficial use. This, however, is absurd because 
(as pointed out above) there is neither a right to carry out such 
development nor a right to get compensation if permission is refused.  
This result is explained by the Government in Circular 13/83 on the 
grounds that the remedy, by way of a purchase notice, is not intended to be 
available when an owner merely shows that he or she is unable to realize 
the full development value of the land. However, now that there are no 
rights to compensation for refusal of such development, this justification is 
gone, but the provision has not been amended. Although the Circular has 
not been cancelled or updated, it seems that the government has changed 
its mind. It seems that the Secretary of State now considers schedule 3 
development irrelevant to the question of whether the land is incapable of 
beneficial use and relevant only to the assessment of the land’s value 
should the purchase notice be confirmed.63 This interpretation goes against 
the literal meaning of the words and the history of the provision, but as the 
Encyclopedia of Planning Law and Practice points out,64 it makes sense 
because there is no right to carry out such development, and so in fact, it 
cannot make the land capable of beneficial use unless express permission 
is granted. 
III. PLANNING BLIGHT AND INJURIOUS AFFECTION 
“Planning blight” is described by the report Future of Development 
Plans as “the depressing effect on existing property of proposals which 
imply public acquisition and disturbance of the existing use.”65 Planning 
blight is dealt with in section A below.  
The value of property can of course be depressed not just by the threat 
of compulsory purchase, but also by the prospect of the construction and 
use of public works (such as highways), even where these works are not 
going to take place on compulsorily purchased land. This problem is 
known as “injurious affection” and is discussed in section B below. 
 
 
 63. See Hillingdon London BC v. Ashton Homes Planning Inspector, (1987) 2 P.A.D. 341. 
 64. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLANNING LAW AND PRACTICE ¶ 137.09 (Malcolm Grant ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell 1959). 
 65. PLANNING ADVISORY GROUP, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOV’T, THE FUTURE OF 
DEVELOPMENT PLANS: A REPORT BY THE PLANNING ADVISORY GROUP 50 (Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office 1965). This important government paper served as the basis for the major reform of the British 
planning law in 1967. 
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A. Blight Notices 
A blight notice is similar to a purchase notice in that it is a form of 
inverse compulsory purchase because it forces the potential acquiring 
authority to purchase the land ahead of the scheme. The introduction of 
blight notices was necessary. Seriously blighted land normally is still 
capable of beneficial use, and a purchase notice does not afford a remedy 
for the fact that the land has become unsellable. However, it is important 
to realize that a blight notice can only be served if (1) the land falls within 
one of the specified categories of blighted land, which includes typical 
public services such as schools, and (2) the person serving the blight 
notice has a “qualifying interest.”66 
1. The Qualifying Land 
The specified descriptions are complex and diverse. They all cover 
cases where there are proposals that imply that land is likely to be 
compulsorily purchased at some time in the future. The crucial part of the 
various descriptions is the stage at which the proposal must have reached 
before the land comes within the particular category. The present 
categories range from land allocated for public functions in development 
plans to clearance and renewal areas under the Housing legislation.  
The category of development plans67 covers land indicated in a 
development plan that may be required for various public functions. This 
category extends to development plans that have been submitted to the 
Secretary of State for independent examination. Thus, the proposal does 
not have to have been formally adopted.  
Also included is land indicated as required for public functions in a 
non-statutory plan (approved by a resolution passed by a local planning 
authority for the purpose of exercising its development control functions), 
or where the planning authority has resolved or been directed by the 
Secretary of State to safeguard the land for the purpose of public 
functions.68 The word “indicated” is rather vague and has been held by the 
Lands Tribunal to even include diagrams.69  
 
 
 66. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 149 (Eng.). 
 67. The reform of development plans carried out by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 
2004 has resulted in changes to schedule 13 to take into account the new system of development plan 
documents. However, the basic principle has not altered. See Compulsory Purchase Act, 2004, c.5, 
§ 13. 
 68. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, sched. 13, ¶¶ 5, 6 (Eng.). 
 69. See Bowling v. Leeds County Borough Council, (1974) 27 P. & C.R. 531. 
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The land must clearly fall within the specified description. In Bolton 
Corp. v. Owen, the Court of Appeal held that where a development plan 
stated that the land was to be cleared and redeveloped for residential 
purposes, the person serving the blight notice had not shown that the land 
was allocated for the purposes of the functions of a local authority because 
the redevelopment could be carried out by a private developer (though in 
the circumstances this would seem rather unlikely).70 
2. The Qualifying Interests 
The qualifying interests are defined narrowly so as to only include 
those persons who might be expected to suffer particular hardship as a 
result of planning blight. This essentially means that blight notices can 
only be served by the owner-occupiers of residential properties or the 
owner-occupiers of non-domestic property, in which the annual income 
from the business is less than an amount prescribed by the Secretary of 
State.71 
3. Proof of Injury 
Individuals serving blight notices must be able to establish injury to 
their interests in land by showing that they have made reasonable 
endeavors to sell their properties, but because the lands are comprised in 
one of the specified categories, they are unable to sell their interests except 
at prices that are “substantially lower”72 than what they might otherwise 
have been reasonably sold. The burden is on the person serving the notice, 
and the notice may be unsuccessful if there are other reasons why the 
owner has been unable to sell the land.73 What constitutes a “reasonable 
endeavor” is a question of fact and depends on the particular 
circumstances.74 
4. The Process 
The notice must be served on the public body that will acquire the land. 
On being served with a blight notice, the public authority has to decide 
 
 
 70. Bolton Corp. v. Owen, [1962] 1 Q.B. 470. 
 71. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 149 (Eng.). 
 72. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 150 (Eng). The courts have not yet given any 
guidance as to the meaning of the term “substantially lower” used in section 150(1). 
 73. See Malcolm Campbell v. Glasgow Corp., [1972] S.L.T. 8 (Lands Tr. 1972). 
 74. Lade and Lade v. Brighton Corp., (1971) 22 P. & C.R. 737 (Lands Tr.). 
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whether to accept the notice or serve a counter-notice that specifies the 
grounds on which the public authority is rejecting the notice. An obvious 
ground is that the land does not come within any of the specified 
categories. The authority can also head off a counter-notice by stating that 
it does not intend to acquire the property,75 or in certain circumstances, the 
public authority can disclaim any intention of acquiring any part of the 
land during the period of fifteen years from the date of the counter-notice. 
Where there has been such a “disclaimer to purchase,” the powers to 
purchase cease to have effect.76  
These provisions mean that the public authority can, in effect, change 
its mind about compulsorily purchasing a property. If the public authority 
argues that the land does not come within the specified category, this has 
to be decided as at the date of the counter-notice.77 However, the time-
reference may be different when the counter-notice is based on the 
intentions of the authority. In this type of a situation, if the question comes 
before the Lands Tribunal, a public authority may be able to support a 
counter-notice by demonstrating that a change in intentions took place 
after the date of the counter-notice.78 This would seem rather unfair on the 
person affected by blight, and one can argue that the public authority’s 
intentions should be judged as from the date of the counter-notice. 
Once a counter-notice has been served, it will have the effect of 
overriding the blight notice, unless it is referred to the Lands Tribunal 
within two months.79 If no counter-notice is served or it is not upheld by 
the Lands Tribunal, the legal effect is that the named authority is deemed 
to have been authorized to compulsorily purchase the land and to have 
served a notice that cannot be withdrawn.80 Therefore, the public authority 
is forced to acquire the land at a price that will be calculated in the same 
way as if the compulsory purchase had been initiated by the authority 
itself. One possible objection in a counter-notice is that the authority only 
requires part of the land. However, this right is qualified, as under ordinary 
 
 
 75. Or only part of the property. See Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 151(4)(c) 
(Eng.). 
 76. Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 155 (Eng.).  
 77. See Sinclair and Sinclair v. Sec’y of State for Transport, (1997) 75 P. & C.R. 548. 
 78. Id. See also Mancini v. Coventry City Council, (1982) 44 P. & C.R. 114. 
 79. See Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 153 (Eng.). The Lands Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the objections listed in the counter-notice are justified. 
The House of Lords has held this to mean that there is no separate jurisdiction to argue that the 
claimant does not have a qualifying interest, if this has not been made a ground of objection in the 
counter-notice. Essex County Council v. Essex Incorporated Congregational Church Union, [1963] 
A.C. 808 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 80. See Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, § 154 (Eng.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss3/4
p493 Purdue book pages.doc05/06/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] COMPENSATION RIGHTS IN THE U.K. 511 
 
 
 
 
compulsory purchase principles, the claimant’s right to require that the 
entire plot be acquired is transposed onto the blight notice procedures.81 
This generally applies when part of a house or factory cannot be taken 
without causing material detriment to the house or factory, or when a part 
of the park, garden, or house cannot be severed without seriously affecting 
its amenity or convenience.82 
B. Injurious Affection 
Where planning permission is granted to a private developer, the grant 
does not override any private law rights of neighboring land. For example, 
if the use of the land granted by the planning permission is carried out in a 
way that interferes with the use and enjoyment of neighboring land, an 
action may be brought in nuisance. The authority granting the permission 
has no authority to authorize a nuisance.83 In contrast where a statute 
authorizes public works and activities, it will usually be implied that the 
Act confers immunity from being sued in nuisance.84  
However in certain circumstances, Parliament provides for the 
alleviation of hardship caused by public works by paying compensation 
for what is usually termed “injurious affection.”85 This applies in 
situations where the result of taking the land for public works is to sever 
the land from other land that is owned by the claimant. But even if there is 
no severance, there are circumstances where compensation can be claimed 
for adverse consequences on neighboring land of both the construction and 
the use of public works. We will now examine generally the law 
governing injurious affection. 
1. Injurious Affection Due to Severance of Land 
Section 7 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 provides that 
assessment of the amount of compensation for compulsory purchase can 
include the physical damage caused by the severance of the land from the 
 
 
 81. See id. § 166. 
 82. See Compulsory Purchase Act, 1965, c. 56, § 8; Town and Country Planning Act, 1990, c. 8, 
§ 166(2) (Eng.). 
 83. This principle is qualified by the fact that the grant of planning permission can result in a 
change in the character of a neighborhood, which can alter what will amount to a nuisance. See, e.g., 
Gillingham Borough Council v. Medway (Chatham) Dock Co. Ltd., [1993] Q.B. 343; Wheeler v. J.J. 
Saunders Ltd., [1995] 3 W.L.R. 466 (C.A.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 84. See Hammersmith and City Railway Co. v. Brand, [1869–70] L.R. 4 H.L. 171; Allen v. Gulf 
Oil Refining Ltd., [1981] A.C. 1001 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 85. Hammersmith, L.R. 4 H.L. at 175, 178. 
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claimant’s other lands that are not being compulsorily purchased.86 In 
addition, section 7 provides that damage by reason of the remaining land 
being otherwise injuriously affected can also be taken into account when 
assessing the amount of compensation.87 Section 44 of the Land 
Compensation Act 1973 further clarifies that compensation covers 
damages caused by the whole of the works and not just the works on the 
part of the land compulsorily purchased. The courts have broadly 
interpreted this provision by holding that it covers any depreciation of the 
value of the retained land resulting from the exercise of the powers of the 
acquiring authority, including the depreciating effects of loss of privacy 
and amenity.88 The result is that, at least where land is severed, the person 
owning neighboring land is in a stronger position if the damage is caused 
by the public works than if the activities are being carried out by a private 
person. The term “severing of land” would seem to suggest that the 
retained land must be physically touching the land taken. However, the 
courts have held that the land does not have to be actual physically 
contiguous,89 but must at least be “so near to each other and so situated 
that the possession and control of each gives an enhanced value to all of 
them.”90 
2. Injurious Affection Caused by the Construction of Public Works 
Even If No Land Is Taken 
Section 68 of the Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 provides a 
right to compensation “[i]n respect of any lands . . . which shall have been 
taken for or injuriously affected by the execution of the works . . . .”91 
Section 10(2) of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 confirms the right to 
compensation under section 68 by stating that section 10 shall be 
construed “[a]s affording in all cases a right to compensation for injurious 
affection to land which is the same as the right which section 68 of the 
Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 has been construed as affording 
 
 
 86. Compulsory Purchase Act, 1965, c. 56, § 7. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Duke of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board of Works, [1871–72] L.R. 5 H.L. 418. 
 89. See Cowper Essex v. Acton Local Board, [1889] L.R. 14 App Cases 153. The facts involved 
land taken for sewerage work that was separated by a railway from other land owned by the claimant. 
Compare Nisbet Hamilton v. Northern Lighthouses Comrs, [1886] 13 R. 710. In Hamilton, a small 
island, which was compulsorily purchased for a lighthouse, was some distance away from a house that 
was also owned by the claimant. 
 90. See Cowper Essex v. Acton Local Board, [1889] L.R. 14 App Cases 153, 167 (Watson, L.). 
 91. Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, § 68. 
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. . . .”92 This rather convoluted wording casts doubt on whether the way 
that section 68 has been construed is defensible. Certainly, it is doubtful 
that this provision was intended to give the right to compensation to those 
whose land was not being compulsorily purchased.93 Yet in Metropolitan 
Board of Works v. McCarthy,94 the House of Lords held that there was a 
right to compensation for damage to neighboring land as long as, but for 
the authorizing statute, the cause of action would be otherwise actionable 
at common law. However, the loss to the value of the land must have been 
due to the works and not the subsequent use.  
The result is that those who own land next to public works, but do not 
have land acquired for those works, are in a much worse position than 
those who have land taken. The rather dubious rationale is presumably that 
the direct interference with their property rights justifies the special 
treatment. It seems arbitrary that owners of severed land who had small 
parcels taken can get compensation for depreciation caused by the use of 
the works, even if this would not be actionable in common law.  
Wildtree Hotels Ltd. v. Harrow L.B.C.,95 a recent decision by the 
House of Lords, has at least broadened the scope of the right by holding 
that it extends to temporary damage caused by construction, even if the 
capital value of the property will not be diminished once the works are 
completed. On the other hand, the House of Lords also held that damage 
caused by noise, dust, and vibration could not normally be the subject of a 
claim for compensation because it is almost impossible for such a claim to 
satisfy the requirements that (1) the damage has to be caused by the lawful 
exercise of statutory powers, and (2) the damage would have been 
actionable at common law in the absence of statutory protection.96 To 
succeed at common law, it was necessary to show that the building works 
had been conducted without reasonable consideration for the neighbors. 
Conversely, if the works were carried out without all reasonable regard 
and care for the interest of other persons, they would not be made immune 
from liability by the authorizing act. So either way, it would not be 
compensable under section 10. In the latter case, if landowners wished to 
recover for such damage, they had to assume and discharge the burden of 
 
 
 92. Compulsory Purchase Act, 1845, § 10. 
 93. See Argyle Motors (Birkenhead) Ltd. v. Birkenhead Corp., [1975] A.C. 99, 102, 129–31 
(H.L.) (Wilberforce, L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 94. [1874–75] L.R. 7 H.L. 243.  
 95. [2001] 2 A.C. 1 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 96. Id. 
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proving in an ordinary action for nuisance that the undertaker of 
infrastructure construction had exceeded its statutory powers. 
3. Rights to Compensation Under the Land Compensation Act 1973 
The courts have frequently deprecated the state of the law regarding 
compensation for compulsory purchase. Recently in Waters v. Welsh 
Development Agency,97 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead summed up the 
position in the following words:  
Unhappily the law in this country on this important subject is 
fraught with complexity and obscurity. To understand the present 
state of the law it is necessary to go back 150 years to the Lands 
Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. From there a path must be traced, 
not always easily, through piecemeal development of the law by 
judicial exposition and statutory provision.98  
In the same case in the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Carnwath took 
the view that “[t]he right to compensation for compulsory acquisition is a 
basic property right. It is unfortunate that ascertaining the rules upon 
which compensation is to be assessed can involve such a tortuous journey, 
through obscure statutes and apparently conflicting case law, as has been 
necessary in this case.”99 The case itself concerned the notorious “pointe 
gourde” rule,100 but the comments could equally apply to the law on 
injurious affection.  
However, the enactment of the Land Compensation Act 1973 has done 
something to address the problems101 of those who own land close to 
public works but cannot get compensation under section 7 of the 
Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 because no land of theirs has been taken. 
The Land Compensation Act 1973 attempts to redress the problem by 
providing for a right to compensation for depreciation caused by the use of 
public works.102 The claim is limited to depreciation resulting from the use 
 
 
 97. Waters v. Welsh Development Agency, [2004] UKHL (H.L.) 19, [2004] 2 All E.R. 915, 919 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 98. Waters, 2 All E.R. at 919. 
 99. Id.  
 100. See generally Pointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co. Ltd. v. Sub-Intendant of Crown 
Lands, [1947] A.C. 565 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 101. In 1969, Justice pointed out that it was a sad commentary on the present law that an owner of 
land in an area through which a motorway was to be constructed should prefer that the motorway 
should take all his property rather than go near it. JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR COMPULSORY 
ACQUISITION AND REMEDIES FOR PLANNING RESTRICTIONS (1969). 
 102. See The Land Compensation Act, 1973, c. 26, § 1. 
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of the public works creating the following physical factors: “noise, 
vibration, smell, fumes, smoke and artificial lighting and the discharge on 
to the land . . . of any solid or liquid substance.”103 It creates a narrower 
version of the common law tort of nuisance; indeed, compensation is only 
payable if there is statutory immunity from actions in nuisance in respect 
of the public works.104 It should also be noted that loss of privacy, loss of a 
view, and general loss of amenity are not included. Thus, the right to 
compensation is less generous than that provided under section 7 of the 
Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 for landowners who have had part of their 
land taken for public works.105  
The public works covered under the Land Compensation Act 1973 are 
the use of any highway, any aerodrome, and any other works provided or 
used in the exercise of statutory powers.106 The Act also tries to cover the 
problem where existing works (the Act is not retrospective) are altered; 
however, intensification of the use is not covered. Thus, section 9 covers 
depreciation caused by alterations to the carriageway of an existing road, 
alteration of a runway or apron at an aerodrome, and reconstruction, 
extension, or alteration of other public works.107 Even depreciation caused 
by a change of use in respect of any public works is covered, except in the 
case of highways or aerodromes.108  
The provisions of the Land Compensation Act 1973 can result in some 
rough justice. A good example is the recent case of Brunt v. Southampton 
International Airport,109 where claims were brought by owners of houses 
in Twyford, near Winchester, who contended that the value of their houses 
had been diminished by increased noise from aircraft movements arising 
from alterations made at the airport between 1993 and 1995. There was no 
dispute that there had been substantial works to the taxiways and aprons at 
the airport during that period. The dispute was over whether the main 
purpose of the works was to provide facilities for a greater number of 
aircraft, in which case the landowners would be eligible for compensation 
under section 9(6)(b). It seems that the works had not been made for the 
purpose of increasing the numbers of aircraft, but rather to increase the 
 
 
 103. See id. § 1(2). 
 104. See id. §§ 1(1), 1(2). 
 105. See, e.g., Shepherd and Shepherd v. Lancashire County Council, (1976) 33 P. & C.R. 296 
(holding that the right to compensation does not cover a land’s depreciation that was caused simply by 
being close to a refuse tip). 
 106. Land Compensation Act, 1973, c. 26, § 1(3). 
 107. See id. § 9. 
 108. Id. 
 109. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 93, [2005] 2 P. & C.R. 21 (C.A.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
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number of passengers that could pass through the airport by allowing 
larger aircraft to use the aerodrome. The majority in the Court of Appeal 
took a literalist approach and upheld the decision of the Lands Tribunal 
that the claim did not come within the wording of section 9(6)(b), even 
though the alterations undoubtedly had resulted in an increase in the 
disturbance to neighboring properties. Lord Justice Ward, in a robust 
dissenting judgment, argued that the Court should have taken a purposive 
or teleological approach to interpretation and read the provisions so that 
they covered all type of new works that resulted in increased disturbance. 
To be eligible for compensation under the Land Compensation Act 
1973, it is not enough for the claimant to show a qualifying interest; the 
claimant must have acquired the interest before the date that the works 
first came into use.110 Similar to blight notices, the right to compensation 
only applies to owners of residential dwellings, owner-occupiers of 
agricultural units, and owner-occupiers of small properties.111  
In calculating the depreciating effect, it is to be assumed that planning 
permission will not be granted for development. However, the 
development exception found in paragraph 2, schedule 3, which is 
concerned with the change of use of a single dwelling-house into two or 
more dwelling-units, apply here too. Thus, in assessing damage, the 
appraisers may take into account expectations that paragraph 2, schedule 3 
development would have occurred.112 Normally, this would not have an 
appreciable effect on the value of the property. In addition, there are 
provisions that require appraisers to take into account increases caused to 
the land by the use of the works113 and any right to mitigating works, such 
as insulation works, to be carried out on the property.114 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
An adverse planning decision could bring into play the human rights 
set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
Human Rights Act was enacted in the U.K. in 1998, thereby making it 
unlawful in United Kingdom law for a public authority to act in a way that 
is incompatible with the convention rights set out in the Act.115 However, 
if the provisions of primary legislation, such as an act of Parliament, mean 
 
 
 110. The Land Compensation Act, 1973, c. 26, § 1(1). 
 111. See id. § 2(5). 
 112. See id. § 4(3). 
 113. See id. § 6(1). 
 114. See id. § 4(3). 
 115. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6(1). 
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that the authority was obliged to act as it has, the action is not unlawful.116 
The fact that, prior to the commencement of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
no decisions of the European Court of Human Rights held that the United 
Kingdom’s planning laws breached the Convention would suggest that the 
U.K. law is not incompatible. On the other hand, it has to be recognized 
that it is now possible for the United Kingdom courts to give the 
convention rights a stricter interpretation than the European Court has 
done; the U.K. courts are only required to take the European Court of 
Human Rights’ jurisprudence into account.117 So far, there is little sign 
that the Human Rights Act 1998 will have much impact on this branch of 
the law. 
However, as indicated in the introduction, an adverse planning decision 
could invoke not only article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR 
(protecting property rights), but also article 8 (protecting private life, 
family life, and the home).118 The obvious example would be where an 
applicant was refused planning permission for residential use of land. So 
far, most of the cases have been concerned with gypsies who, because of 
their nomadic way of life, are constantly in dispute with planning 
authorities.119  
The human rights under both article 8 and article 1 are qualified.120 The 
ECHR recognizes the authority of the state to interfere in article 8 rights 
when the interference is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society for the interests of national security, public safety, the 
economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.121 In the case of article 1, the state may limit the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions where such control is in the general 
interest.122 In R (on the application of Michael and Jenny Boyd) v. English 
Nature,123 Rabinder Singh QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge, pointed out that 
 
 
 116. See id. § 6(2). 
 117. See id. § 2(1). 
 118. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, art. 8 (Eng.); Id. sched. 1, pt. 2; Protocol to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 
1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 119. The Human Rights Act 1998 has had a significant impact on the law concerned with the 
enforcement of planning law. See South Bucks Dist. Council v. Porter, [2003] UKHL (H.L.) 26, 
[2003] 2 A.C. 558 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 120. The Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, art. 8 (Eng.); Id. sched. 1, pt. 2, Protocol to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 
1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 121. See id. art. 8. 
 122. See id. art. 1. 
 123. [2003] EWHC 1105. 
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article 1, unlike article 8, does not require the interference to be necessary 
for a pressing social need. He nevertheless held that the state’s interference 
with the right of possession must be proportionate.124 
To date, the European Court of Human Rights and the United Kingdom 
courts have held that the public interest justifies the existence of planning 
controls and the interference with the rights that these controls entail.125 
Yet, the interference must be proportionate. Thus, in Buckland v Secretary 
of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions,126 a case 
concerning article 8, Justice Sullivan expressed the following view: 
Our planning system is based on the premise that land owners 
“properly expect to be able to use or develop their land as they 
judge best unless the consequences for the environment or the 
community would be unacceptable” (see paragraph 36 of PPG1). 
Or, to use the language of the European Court of Human Rights, 
planning permission will be granted unless there is a “pressing 
social need for a refusal.”127 
In terms of article 1,128 a planning control is categorized as a control 
over the use of property rather than a taking, unless the land is rendered 
useless because it cannot be used for an alternative purpose.129 In the latter 
case, the purchase notice process would normally satisfy article 1 by 
affording compensation. Although, the Human Rights Act 1998 might 
require a more liberal interpretation of the meaning of “beneficial use,” so 
far, there has been no case on this issue.  
Amendments to legislation that have the effect of taking away property 
rights, such as changes to the Use Classes Order, might also come within 
article 1 of the First Protocol. However, the Court of Appeal in Trailer & 
Marina (Leven) Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, English Nature130 rejected a claim that a change in the law, 
which had the result of taking away a right to compensation, was in breach 
 
 
 124. See id. ¶¶ 19, 20. For an analysis of how the courts have interpreted the need to show 
proportionality principle in planning law, see Michael Purdue, The Human Rights Act 1998, Planning 
Law and Proportionality, 6 ENVT. L. REV. 161 (2004).  
 125. See Buckley v. U.K., 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1274; Chapman v. U.K., 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
47. 
 126. [2001] EWHC (Admin) 524.  
 127. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 128. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, pt. 2; Protocol to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 129. See Sporrong v. Sweden (1982) 5 E.H.R.R. 35; Pine Valley Devs. v. Ireland, (1992) 14 
E.H.R.R. 319. 
 130. [2004] EWHC (QB) 153 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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of article 1. The Countryside and Rights of Way Act of 2000 made 
changes to the Wildlife and Countryside Act of 1981 that resulted in the 
removal of the previous rights to compensation if operations were 
prohibited by designation of land as a “Site of Special Scientific Interest.” 
The Court held that restrictions on the use of property in the public interest 
without compensation, which fell short of de facto expropriation, would 
not normally be in breach of article 1, unless the detrimental effect upon 
the individual far outweighed the public benefit.131  
A similar rule would likely hold regarding injurious affection. In 
theory, the granting of planning permission for a development that 
seriously affects the use and enjoyment of neighboring land could equally 
be said to engage both article 8 and article 1.132 However, in the case of 
private development, the chances of success are very remote. The injurious 
affection would have to be very severe to engage either article 8 or article 
1. Furthermore, the neighbor in these cases would have private law 
remedies in nuisance because the grant of planning permission does not 
give immunity for a nuisance action.  
This issue came up in the Court of Appeal decision of Lough v. First 
Secretary of State,133 where it was argued that the decision of a planning 
Inspector to grant planning permission for the development of a twenty-
story building with twenty-eight dwellings and shops and restaurants in 
the Bankside area of Southwark would result in the loss of privacy, 
overlooking, loss of light, loss of a view, and interference with television 
reception.134 The Court basically held that the Inspector, in coming to his 
decision, had fairly balanced the competing interests. The loss of value 
that would be caused by the development was significant, but that did not 
constitute a separate or independent basis for alleging a breach of the 
Convention rights involved. 
On the other hand, articles 8 and 1 were successfully used in Dennis v. 
Ministry of Defence135 to find a claim to damages with respect to aircraft 
noise caused by RAF harrier jets flying over property. The court held that 
there had been an interference with Mr. and Mrs. Dennis’ human rights 
under article 8 and article 1 and that an appropriate assessment of damages 
at common law would provide “just satisfaction” under section 8 of the 
 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 7; Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 
302-c (1994). 
 133. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 905 (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 134. Id. 
 135. [2003] EWHC (QB) 793. 
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Human Rights Act 1998.136 The court, however, refused to grant an 
injunction to stop the interference on the grounds that this was not in the 
public interest.137 The court held that, while in this regard the public 
interest was greater than the individual private interests of Mr. and Mrs. 
Dennis, it would not be proportionate to pursue or give effect to the public 
interest without compensation.138 
Yet, in Marcic v. Thames Water Utility Ltd.,139 the House of Lords 
rejected a claim that repeated flooding of a home garden with sewage from 
the public authority’s overloaded sewers was in breach of article 8.140 The 
House of Lords took the view that the statutory scheme was not 
incompatible with article 8 because it struck a reasonable balance between 
the interests of the customers paying sewerage charges and those affected 
by flooding.141 
The problem with this approach is that it leaves open the question of 
whether, even if the statutory scheme itself is compatible with the ECHR, 
its operation in a particular case may be incompatible. If Mr. Marcic had 
complained to the Director General under the statutory scheme and then 
sought judicial review of the failure to take enforcement action, the court 
would have been faced with that question.  
Lord Nichols seemed to have some sympathy for this reasoning by 
stating that he had some concern about the lack of compensation.142 It 
seems that section 7(2)(b) of the Water Supply and Sewerage Services 
(Customer Service Standards) Regulations143 provides for a modest 
compensation scheme for internal flooding, while there is no statutory 
provision regarding external sewer flooding.144 Lord Nichols then went on 
to observe at paragraph 45: 
It seems to me that, in principle, if it is not practicable for reasons of 
expense to carry out remedial works for the time being, those who 
enjoy the benefit of effective drainage should bear the cost of 
paying some compensation to those whose properties are situated 
lower down in the catchments area and who, in consequence, have 
 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. [2001] 3 All E.R. 698. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Water Supply and Sewerage Services (Customer Service Standards) Regulations, 1989, S.I. 
1159, § 7(2)(b). 
 144. Id. 
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to endure intolerable sewer flooding, whether internal or external. 
As the Court of Appeal noted, the flooding is the consequence of 
the benefit provided to those making use of the system: [2002] QB 
929, 1001, para 113. The minority who suffer damage and 
disturbance as a consequence of the inadequacy of the sewerage 
system ought not to be required to bear an unreasonable burden. 
This is a matter the Director and others should reconsider in the 
light of the facts in the present case.145 
This suggests that the lack of compensation may mean that “injurious 
affection” may be actionable under the Human Rights Act 1998 as not 
being proportionate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The general rule that there is no right to compensation for a refusal or 
conditional grant of planning permission is now so well established that it 
would be futile to call for any major change. It is true that it means that the 
development control system has similarities to a gambling machine in that, 
if planning permission is granted, this grant can ring the equivalent of 
three bells by providing a substantial windfall to the owner of the land. On 
the other hand, adverse planning decisions do not usually directly lower 
the value of the land, and there is provision for any obvious wipe-outs 
caused by discontinuance and revocation orders. Also, as planning 
decisions are made in the public interest, if LPAs had to pay out 
compensation for refusals, this could lead to bad planning. At the moment, 
the United Kingdom government is more concerned with taxing the uplift 
in value. 
Nevertheless, in the case of the revocation and modification of grants 
of permission, there are certain anomalies and problems. In particular, 
attention should be given to the problems involving proof that damage was 
caused by changes to the Use Classes Order and designations that alter 
permitted development rights. To limit the amount of compensation, it 
might be necessary to limit the compensation to the cost of works and 
preparation incurred in reliance directly on the rights. Decreases in the 
value of the land should remain uncompensated. It is also high time that 
the remaining references to schedule 3 development be scrapped when 
assessing the value of land following revocation. 
 
 
 145. Marcic v. Thames Water Utils. Ltd., [2003] UKHL (H.L.) 66, [2004] 2 A.C. 42, ¶ 45 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
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In the case of purchase notices, the fact that they are used so little 
might suggest at first that not much change is needed. On the other hand, 
the infrequent use of purchase notices by landowners may be caused by 
difficulties they encounter to prove that the land is not capable of 
reasonable beneficial use in its existing state. The present interpretation is 
too narrow and should be extended to cover situations where the adverse 
planning decisions do not leave any economically beneficial use.146 Again, 
it is time for the references to schedule 3 to be removed. 
The area of injurious affection deserves a complete overhaul. The old 
provisions in the Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 should go. The 
Lands Compensation Act 1973 should be extended to cover losses caused 
by both the construction and the use of public works. At the same time, the 
decision in Brunt v. Southampton International Airport could be 
overturned so that Lord Justice Wade could no longer complain that the 
result resembled the actions of the promise of the tyrant Temures. He 
promised not to shed the blood of the garrison of a town if they 
surrendered and then fulfilled the promise by burning them alive.147 
 
 
 146. For more on this topic, see the approach to “takings” of land in the United States in Jeremy 
Rowan Robinson & Andrea Ross, Compensation for Environmental Protection in Britain: A 
Legislative Lottery, 5 J. ENVTL. L. 245 (1995); Michael Purdue, When A Regulation of Land becomes a 
Taking of Land—A Look at Two Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 4 J. PLAN. & 
ENV’T L. 279 (1995). 
 147. See Brunt v. Southampton International Airport, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 93, [2005] 2 P. & C.R. 
21, ¶¶ 60–62 (C.A.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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